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EMPLOYER RACIAL DISCRIMINATION:
REVIEWING THE ROLE OF THE NLRB
Lawrence F. Doppelt*
I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
One must recognize the serious failings of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ["EEOC"]1 in dealing with racial discrimi-
nation in employment, 2 and, consequently, the role of the National
Labor Relations Board ["NLRB"] 3 therein may appropriately be re-
examined. For, the NLRB continues to hold employer discrimination
on the basis of race4 not violative of the Act.' Yet,
[r]acial discrimination in employment is one of the most de-
plorable forms of discrimination known to our society, for it
deals ... with... the ability to provide decently for one's family
in a job or profession for which he qualifies .... 6
*Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology/Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.A.,
1956, Northwestern University; J.D., 1959, Yale University.
The author expresses his appreciation to Colleen Khoury, a student at the I.I.T./
Chicago-Kent Law School, for her research assistance.
The EEOC is charged with enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1973) [hereinafter cited as Title VII]. Section 703 makes it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against employees in terms or condi-
tions of employment on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex or national origin."
2 See joint letter from Senators Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Chairman, and Jacob K. Javits,
Ranking Minority Member, United States Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, to
EEOC Chairman John H. Powell, Sept. 10, 1974. The Senators deplore, inter alia, the
tremendous backlog of cases pending before the EEOC, the poor quality of EEOC investiga-
tions, the lack of success of EEOC conciliation efforts, and the generally dismal efficiency
and performance of the EEOC under Title VII. 180 BNA Daily Labor Reports E-1 (Sept. 10,
1974). As of October, 1974, the backlog of unresolved charges at the EEOC was approaching
100,000, and thousands of charges had been on file for over two years. Wall Street J., Oct. 22,
1974, at 22, col. 4.
The NLRB administers the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as the Act].
This article deals exclusively with racial discrimination.
5 See Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973). While Jubilee involved sex discrimina-
tion, the NLRB utilized the case to set forth its conclusion that discrimination based on race,
religion, color, sex, or national origin is not, as such, a violation of the Act.
6 Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970). That racial discrimi-
nation adversely affects a person's ability to achieve fair earnings and job security is a truism.
A survey of economic statistics by various federal agencies from 1900 to 1970 documents that
in 1970 the median black income was 61 percent of whites, while the black unemployment
rate was almost twice that of whites. BNA, FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 490: 211-18 (1974).
In the current recession, the national unemployment figure for nonwhites is 12.8 percent as
opposed to 6.4 percent for whites. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1975, at 7, col. 3. See also Adams,
Toward Fair Employment and the EEOC: A Study of Compliance Procedures Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5 n.l EEOC CONTRACT 70-15 (August 31, 1972).
(Introductory materials to the problems of discrimination and poverty are listed.)
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The NLRB has not entirely eschewed the field of racial discrimina-
tion. Firm action has been taken by the NLRB against certain
discriminatory practices by unions and, on a more limited basis,
against actions by employers. However, the NLRB's pattern of
enforcement clearly demonstrates a greater willingness to police labor
organizations.7
For example, if a union discriminates on the basis of race in em-
ployment matters or causes an employer to do so, it violates the Act.8
Similarly, union policies or agreements fostering racially discrimina-
tory practices are held unlawful by the NLRB.9 Once the NLRB finds
a union guilty of racial discrimination, the NLRB may revoke the
union's certified status1° or refuse to issue even an initial certification,
or, presumably, a Gissel-type bargaining order,1' in favor of the
union.' 2
7 Early in its history, the N LRB recognized that a union which was the exclusive represen-
tative of a group of employees had a statutory duty to treat fairly all employees in the group,
irrespective of race, color, creed, or national origin. Carter Mfg., 59 N.L.R.B. 804 (1944).
The Supreme Court first enunciated the union duty of fair representation in cases arising
under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210(1944); Steele v. Louisville, Nashville R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) for recent Supreme Court views on the
union's duty of fair representation (race was not at issue).
8 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1961), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1963). See also cases cited in note 9 infra. While Miranda did not involve race as such, it is
commonly cited for the proposition that fair representation is required under Sections
8(b)(l)(a) and 8(b)(2) of the Act.
9 Houston Maritime Ass'n, 168 N.L.R.B. 615 (1967); United Rubber Workers (Business
League of Gadsden), 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Galveston Maritime, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964), enforced, 368
F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B.
1573 (1964); Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962); Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318
(1953).
10 Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318
(1953).
II In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), the Supreme Court held that the
NLRB may order an employer to recognize and bargain with a union having authorization
cards from a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit even without an election, if,
after the union secures majority status, the employer engages in serious unfair labor practices
having the "tendency to undermine majority status and impede the election process." Id. at
614. See generally Doppelt & Ladd, Gissel Packing Company-The NLRB Applies the
Standards, 49 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161 (1972), for a review of Gissel-type bargaining orders.
12 Bekins Moving and Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 7 (1974). Bekins was not itself an unfair
labor practice case; rather, it involved NLRB certification policies in representation matters.
However, the NLRB holding that it would not certify a union which discriminates in
membership or representation on the basis of race, alienage, or national origin is clearly
equally applicable to Gissel bargaining orders establishing a union as a collective bargaining
agent. Bekins has its roots in NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d
471 (8th Cir. 1973), where the Court refused to enforce a Gissel remedy in view of alleged
union racial discrimination. The Court in effect held that NLRB machinery is unavailable to a.
union practicing racial discrimination.
Employer Racial Discrimination
NLRB restrictions on employer conduct, on the other hand, have
not dealt directly with the problem of employer racial discrimination.
Reprisals against employees who engage in concerted activities to
protest alleged racist practices have been deemed unlawful, 3 as has
employer participation with unions in discrimination. 14 An employer's
refusal to bargain concerning the elimination of discriminatory conduct
violates the Act,15 and employer agreements to incorporate such con-
duct in a contract are similarly forbidden. 6 Finally, flagrant employer
appeals to racism during a pre-election period, while not an unfair
labor practice as such, will warrant the NLRB's overturning an other-
wise valid election.17
However, these NLRB restrictions on employer conduct are clearly
not central to the problem of employer discrimination, being merely
ancillary thereto.' 8 What remains untouched by the NLRB, therefore,
is the most prevalent and direct form of conduct-employer discrimina-
tion in hiring, firing, and job opportunities based on race. By failing to
label this discrimination unlawful, the NLRB has removed itself from
the mainstream of employer racism.
In direct opposition to the NLRB's stance is a decision by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. That court holds that because
employer racial discrimination creates an unjustified clash of interests
among groups of workers and fosters docility in its victims, the dis-
,S Such conduct violates Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Washington State Service Employees,
188N.L.R.B.957(1971); Mason-Rust, 179N.L.R.B.434(1969); Tanner Motor Livery Ltd.,
148 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1964), 166 N.L.R.B. 551 (1967), enforcement denied, 419 F.2d 216 (9th
Cir. 1969).
14 Houston Maritime Ass'n, 168 N.L.R.B. 615 (1967); United Rubber Workers, 150
N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368F.2d 12(5thCir. 1966),cert. denied, 389U.S. 837(1967);
Galveston Maritime, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1961).
5 Southwestern Pipe Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 364 (1969), modified on other grounds, 444 F.2d
340(5th Cir. 1969); Farmers Cooperative Congress, 169 N.L.R.B. 290(1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d
1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969). See also note 20 infra.
18 United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368.F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Galveston Maritime, 148 N.L.R.B. 987 (1964), enforced,
368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
11 Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
,8 For example, reprisals against employees for engaging in concerted activities, regard-
less of any racial motivation, violates the Act. Salt River Valley Water Users Ass'n v.
NLRB, 206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1953). Employers cooperating with unions in discriminating
against employees also violate the Act (racism not being a necessary element). Radio Officers
Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); A. Nabowski, 148 N.L.R.B. 876 (1964), aff'd, 359 F.2d
46 (6th Cir. 1966). Similarly, employer refusals to bargain generally over terms and condi-
tions of employment are a violation of the Act. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 203 (1964). Moreover, pre-election appeals too strongly geared to emotionalism
may, in any event, constitute grounds for overturning an otherwise valid election. Storkline
Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 875 (1963).
SPRING 1975]
Journal of Law Reform
crimination inhibits free employee exercise of concerted activities 19
and thereby interferes with protected rights under the Act.2"
The NLRB and various commentators2 rely upon three basic legal
arguments in rejecting this interpretation: first, the EEOC, and not the
NLRB, is the sole and proper agency for litigating racial issues;22
second, employer racial discrimination does not interfere with the
protected rights of employees under the Act,23 and third, it is not,
and never was, Congress' intent in passing the Act to bring racial dis-
crimination within its purview. 4
Unquestionably, each of these legal arguments has, or at some time
had, surface appeal, and, at one time, considerable force. The great
mass of legal commentary supports at least one of these contentions.2
On the other hand, countervailing legal positions which are equally
meritorious should not be overlooked.26 Yet that is precisely what the
NLRB has done, failing to accord to such opposing contentions the
weight to which they are entitled. In fact, the NLRB has cavalierly
failed to take notice not only of basic arguments contrary to its own
holdings, 27 but of those in support as well.28
The result of this stance has been that the NLRB has not faced the
issues that should be dispositive of this matter. For, whether or not
'" Section 8(a)(l) of the Act prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in violation of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. Section 7 of the Act
protects, inter alia, the right to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
20 United Packing House Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 903 (1969). The Court held that employer discrimination on the basis of race or
national origin was a violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. This is the only case that has so
held.
21 Among the various books or articles on United Packing House Workers v. NLRB, or the
issues raised therein are Boyce, Racial Discrimination and the NLRA, 65 Nw. U.L. REV.
232 (1970); Gould, Racial Equality in Jobs and Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the
Burger Court, 68 MICH. L. REV. 237 (1969); Gould, The Emerging Law Against Racial
Discrimination in Employment, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 359 (1969); Sovern, The National Labor
Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 563 (1964); Note, Allocating
Jurisdiction Over Racial Issues Between the EEOC and NLRB: A Proposal, 54 CORNELL L.Q. 943 (1969).
22 See, e.g., Silberman, The Search For an Effective Remedy in Employment Discrimina-
tion, 23 N.Y.U. ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 133 (1970).
23 See, e.g., Gould, The Emerging Law Against Racial Discrimination in Employment,
supra note 21; Note, Employer Racial Discrimination as an Unfair Labor Practice-New
Power for the NLRB, 57 GEO. L.J. 1313 (1969). This is the main ground upon which the
NLRB relies.
24 See, e.g., Boyce, supra note 21; Gould, The Emerging Law Against Racial Discrimina-
tion, supra note 21.
21 See note 21 supra.
26 See part 11 infra.
27 Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973) takes little orno notice of the legal arguments
set forth in part 11 infra.
21 Jubilee Mfg. Co. similarly takes little or no notice of arguments favoring its own
position.
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the NLRB should consider cases of employer racial discrimination is,
in the last analysis, a policy question, especially since the legal argu-
ments on both side of the question are equally convincing.29 The
NLRB, however, has refused to look past its own legal position to
consider the policy arguments.
30
II. LEGAL CONTENTIONS
A. The Proper Forum Argument
While the contention that the EEOC is the sole and proper agency
for dealing with employer racial discrimination 3 was, perhaps, once
viable, it is now established that there are "parallel or overlapping
remedies against discrimination," and that an individual is entitled to
pursue "his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and
federal statutes. '32 This clearly applies to litigation before the NLRB
as well as before other federal agencies. 33
Thus, if a racially discriminatory practice is otherwise violative of
the Act, the NLRB will have concurrent jurisdiction with the
EEOC. 34 The latter agency, although a proper forum, is not the sole
one for matters coming under Title VII.
B. Interference with Protected Employee Rights
The NLRB has rejected, on the basis of.three major premises, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals' conclusion that racial dis-
crimination interferes with protected employee rights. 35 First, the
NLRB reasons that, while racial discrimination may divide employees,
it may also "coalesce" them, thereby fostering, rather than thwarting,
group action. 36 In addition, it finds that docility is only "one of several
possible consequences" of employer racial discrimination, with in-
29 See part III infra.
30 Or if it has, it has not so stated. But see Member Kennedy's concurring opinion in Bekins
Moving and Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 7 (1974), where he expresses concern over the
possible impact on the NLRB if it takes jurisdiction over Title VII matters.
31 See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
32 Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
33 This is made quite clear by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36 (1974), wherein the Court quotes with approval a senatorial interpretative memoran-
dum to Title VII stating, inter alia, "If a given action should violate both Title VII and the
National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board would not be deprived of
jurisdiction." Id. at 1019 n.9.
34 United Packing House Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
35 United Packing House Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969),cert. denied,
396 U.S. 903 (1969).
36 Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973).
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creased "militancy" being an equally probable consequence.37 Finally,
the Board concludes, on the basis of the above, that racial discrimina-
tion is not "inherently destructive" of employee rights. 38
This NLRB response overlooks the realities of the situation and
relies upon questionable legal analysis. Actually, the Board decision
itself provides the basis for inferences which yield results quite con-
trary to its own conclusions.
The NLRB does not deny that employer racial discrimination has
a foreseeable effect of dividing groups of workers and causing docility
among the victims. On the contrary, it accepts the fact that this may
be the result 3 -indeed, a different finding would be suspect in the view
of the well-documented opinions of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals4" and of the Board's dissenting member." Moreover, the
NLRB's own experience vividly documents that racial messages by
employers may divide employees and suppress concerted activity.42
Similarly, labor consultants frequently encounter employers who
utilize racism during pre-election periods to divide employees, thereby
preventing their unionization.4 3 That racial fear and prejudice are
often encouraged in both union and nonunion shops to prevent em-
ployees from forming concerted fronts is, in fact, well known by those
who have worked in the field of labor relations. 44
Inasmuch as employer racial discrimination does, therefore, have
a foreseeable coercive effect on concerted activity, the fact that it may
not always result in such is, as a legal matter, irrelevant. Obviously,
the NLRB is correct that racial discrimination may result in cohesive-
ness and militancy, rather than divisiveness and apathy. But so, too,
may union discrimination which, nevertheless, remains unlawful. For
31 Id. at 273.
31 Id. at 272.
31 Id. at 272, 273. Indeed, the NLRB did not dispute this before the District Columbia
Court of Appeals. United Packing House Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d at 1136.
40 United Packing House Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d at 1135-37.
41 Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272, 274 (1973) (Jenkins, dissenting); The Emporium,
192 N.L.R.B. 173 (1971) (Jenkins, dissenting).
4" Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962); Allen Morrison Sign Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 73
(1962). See also cases cited in note 13 supra.
43 For example, employers may spread the word in predominantly white plants that if the
union gets in it will require more black employees, bring in black union bosses, or use union
dues money to support black causes.
41 See letter from Walter Reuther, President of the United Automobile Workers of
America Union, to Senator Lister Hill, Feb. 11, 1964, in support of the passage of Title VII:
Today anti-union employers seek the same result [dividing workers] by a new
division of the workers in which they would play off white against Negro to
perpetuate fear, to depress wages, and to create tension and hostility between
working groups.... [E]mployers are playing the racial discrimination game to
break the strength of labor and prevent organization.
110 Cong. Rec. 7206 (1964).
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example, wrongful employer discrimination against union leaders
may, in fact, lead to unity, rather than fear.45 Many are the concerted
strikes which have directly resulted from, and been made more mili-
tant by, unlawful union-busting tactics. 46 However, the fact that em-
ployer unlawful conduct thus results in unity and strength, rather than
divisiveness and docility, does not make it any the less invalid in view
of the foreseeably coercive effect. 41 Similarly, the fact that racial dis-
crimination may not actually deter concerted activity does not render
it non-violative of the Act where such restraint is, admittedly, a clearly
foreseeable result thereof.
Furthermore, the NLRB is wrong, as a matter of law, in requiring
that racial discrimination be "inherently destructive" of employee
rights under the Act in order to be unlawful. It suffices that it have a
foreseeable effect of interfering with employee concerted activities, as
admittedly it does. 4s For, against this foreseeable result is an absolute
lack of business justification therefor.49 And where conduct foreseeably
coercive of protected employee rights is unaccompanied by any valid
business purpose, it is violative of the Act without more. 0 It is only
where there is a valid business purpose for a practice that it must be
"inherently destructive" of employee rights to be unlawful. 5'
Finally, the NLRB has overlooked certain inferences which
should, as a matter of economic realities, be drawn from its own con-
clusions. For it is precisely those rather aberrational results of past
discrimination cited by the NLRB52 which are primary causes of to-
day's employer racial practices. These, too, are intimately related to
protected employee activities.
45 A sophisticated employer knows that discharging or discriminating against a union
leader is a two-edged sword. It may well divide, but then again, it may serve to unite. Union
leaders often seize upon such discriminatory tactics to prove to employees that they must,
indeed unify for strength.
46 Cf. Kohler Co., 148 N. L.R. B. 1434 (1964), aff'd, 345 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also
cases cited in A. Cox & D. BOK, LABOR LAW 890-904 (7th ed. 1969).
47Id.
48 See note 51 and accompanying text infra.
40 In view of the legislative intent set forth in Title VII, as well as ethical and moral
considerations, there can be no business justification for racial discrimination.
10 NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967). As stated by Mr. Justice
Goldberg in Am. Ship Bldg. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 339 (1965):
[Tihe correct test for determining whether Section 8(a)(1) has been violated in
cases not involving an employer anti-union motive is whether the business
justification for the employer's action outweighs the interference with Section
7 rights involved. In Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board [324 U.S. 793
(1945)] for example, the Court affirmed a Board holding that a company
"no-solicitation" rule was invalid . . . not because such a rule was "demon-
strably. . . destructive of collective bargaining", but simply because there was
no significant employer justification for the rule and there was a showing of
[protected] union interest. . ..
5' NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
52 Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973).
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That is, employers have recognized, with the NLRB, that victims of
past discrimination may well tend to "coalesce", and/or exercise their
rights in a militant manner.13 It is no secret to employers that blacks
are more likely than whites to organize into unions.54 Employers fur-
ther feel, intuitively,55 that blacks are more likely than whites to mili-
tantly press their grievances, especially where they constitute a shop
majority of employees." And it is for just such reasons that employers
frequently discriminate against blacks in hiring and job opportunities.
Such reasons for discriminating are, of course, unlawful under the
Act. For, they are grounded on deterring employees from engaging
in union and/or other concerted protective activities.5 While not all
employers have such unlawful intent under the Act in engaging in dis-
criminatory practices, it is naive not to recognize that numerous acts
of racial discrimination are based on just such wrongful intent.
In determining the rights and duties of parties under the Act, s the
NLRB can certainly take note of the foregoing widespread wrongful
motivation59 behind employer racial discrimination. And, absent any
possible employer justification for racial discrimination, an inference
of wrongful intent under the Act may thereby be added to the scale to
find illegal activity6" lacking contrary evidence from the employer. 61
In sum, the findings of the NLRB may support the conclusion that
employer racial discrimination, with or without a warrantable infer-
ence of wrongful intent, violates the Act by interfering with protected
employee rights. A contrary conclusion would belie the realities of
industrial relations, human experience, economics, and established
legal principles.
53 Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973).
-4 Black workers are more likely to join unions than white workers, they have joined
unions in a greater proportion to their percentage participation in the work force than whites,
and they have a generally higher labor union representation than white employees. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, SELECTED EARNINGS AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF UNION
MEMBERS, 1970 (1972).
55 Frequently, this intuitive sentiment is correct.
56 Indeed, this fear of "tipping" the racial composition of the work force-and the
apprehension of the militancy that will follow such tipping-is behind much employment
discrimination.
5 This is a classic violation of Section 8(a)(1) and/or Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
8 It is the function of the NLRB to work an adjustment in "weighing the interests of the
employees in concerted activity against the interests of the employer in operating its busi-
ness .. " NLRB v. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. 221, 229 (1963).
59 Of course, some employers are motivated by nothing more than pure prejudice or the
belief that blacks are not as productive as whites. The existence of alternative motivations
should not, however, deter NLRB recognition of the frequent wrongful intent discussed
above.
0 Cf. NLRB v. Stowe Spinning, 336 U.S. 226 (1949), where discriminatory intent tipped
the scales against the employer.
", The NLRB may infer discriminatory intent, even absent specific evidence of a subjec-
tive motivation, based on what human experience teaches is the foreseeable result of certain
conduct. NLRB v. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
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C. Legislative Intent
Probably the strongest legal argument against bringing employer
racial discrimination within the aegis of the Act involves the absence
of legislative intent. 62 There is no doubt that Congress did not have
racial discrimination in mind when passing the Act in 1935,63 and the
legislature has periodically refused to bring employer racism speci-
fically within the ambit of the Act since then.
64
However, Congress' initial intent is not determinative of the issue.
The passage of Title VII evinced a new legislative purpose,6 5 and this
revision must be recognized by the NLRB in implementing the Act.
Plainly, national labor policy embodies the principles of non-
discrimination as a matter of highest priority, . . . and it is a
commonplace that we must construe the NLRA in light of the
broad national policy of which it is a part.66
"Frequently the entire scope of Congressional purpose calls for
careful accommodation of one statutory scheme to another ... .
The Act ". . . must be read with other federal statutes which establish
the national labor policy."6
For example, while Congress did not intend to cover racial dis-
crimination by unions when union unfair labor practices were first
brought within the Act, the NLRB has found that national labor
policy requires such an inclusion.69 Similarly, Congress, when first
considering the act, did not foresee that the NLRB would later defer
62 See M. SOVERN, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 995 (2d ed. 1973). See also
note 24 supra.
63 Id.
64 Congress has refused to enact the following bills which would have made employer
discrimination on the basis of race an unfair labor practice under the Act: S. 1897, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1953); S. 1831, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); H.R. 12348, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1960).
65 "Title VII . . . provides us with a clear mandate from Congress that no longer will the
United States tolerate [racial] discrimination." Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d
888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970).
66 Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 43 U.S.L.W.
4214 (1975). As stated by Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, ". . . Title VII ... unequivocally
makes the eradication of employment discrimination part of the federal labor policy, in light
of which all labor laws must be construed." Id. at 4220. In Emporium Capw'ell, the Court held
that employee picketing to protest alleged racist practices by an employer, and which is
conducted in derogation of the established collective bargaining representative and outside
the orderly contractual grievance procedure, is not protected by the Act. The decision was
not in any way based upon the lack of a need to protect minority interests under the Act;
rather, it was squarely based on the policy of upholding the principle of majority rule through
the exclusive collective bargaining agent. In fact, the Court specifically noted that such
undermining of the majoritarian principle by employees may work against eliminating racial
discrimination rather than in favor of it.
67 Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942).
66 The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. 173, 177 (1971).
69 See cases cited in notes 8, 9, and 10 supra.
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its jurisdiction to the arbitral process. Again, however, this has been
deemed necessary to adjust the Act to national labor poicy. 70
The fact that Congress expressly declined to establish employer
racial discrimination as an employer unfair labor practice71 is not
conclusive of its intent. In recent years, Congress has expressly de-
clined to establish union racial discrimination as an unfair labor
practice under the Act.72 The NLRB nonetheless holds such discrimi-
nation violative of the Act.73 The same argument can be forwarded
with respect to employer discriminatory practices.
Accordingly, the rules of the game have been changed by the pas-
sage of Title VII. The legislative intent therein set forth must be
recognized under, and reconciled with, the Act.
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Acknowledging the existence of valid legal arguments on both sides
of the employer racial discrimination issue, it is quite possible that
policy issues may be decisive. As with the legal contentions, there are
substantial policy arguments in favor of, and in opposition to, an ex-
panded NLRB role.
A. Arguments Favoring an NLRB Role
Employer racial discrimination must be recognized as an industrial
evil which requires prompt elimination. It is, in a sense, "social dyna-
mite, ' 74 straining the economic and social structure of both abuser and
abused. The minority, denied elemental justice, remains educationally,
economically, and psychologically disadvantaged, 75 while the majority
becomes prey to the hatred engendered among the victims of the unjust
practices.
This problem is not being sufficiently handled by the EEOC. 7 An
agency with a backlog of 100,000 pending cases (many on file for over
two years) is an administrative paper tiger.17 The Commission warrants
70 Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). For further examples, see Doppelt,
OSHA: Impact on the NLRA and Arbitration, 20 WAYNE L. REv. 1015, 1016, 1017 (1974).
71 See note 64 supra.
72 S. 2956, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); H.R. 624 and 626, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963);
H.R. 6807 and 6806, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); H.R. 12348, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); S.
1897, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); S. 1831, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
71 See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
7' Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of
Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363, 366 (1966).
71 Id. See also note 6 supra.
76 See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
11 It is not the intent of this article to place the blame for this condition solely on the EEOC.
Congress, which has failed to give the EEOC the power and funding that it needs, must share
the responsibility.
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neither the respect of employees nor the apprehension of employers.
An employer engaging in acts of racial discrimination will scarcely be
deterred by the possibility of a charge which will not be investigated
until well after the facts are stale or forgotten and after the victim is
wholly discouraged.
Even if the EEOC were to operate efficiently, it is doubtful whether
it alone could adequately deal with the problem. Title VII enforcement
is "a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the elimination of
unequal employment opportunities." '78 The EEOC clearly needs help
from other sources if it is to function at a level commensurate with
its stated goals.
The NLRB would be of enormous assistance in reducing the inci-
dence of employer racial discrimination. A competent agency that is
generally respected in the industrial relations area, the NLRB is ad-
ministratively equipped to probe charges of employer discrimination .7
With free legal services, relatively swift procedures, broad remedial
powers, a skilled staff, and a reasonable caseload, 0 the NLRB can
deal as forcefully with actions involving employer discrimination as it
has with actions involving unions."'
Moreover, should it assume jurisdiction over employer racial dis-
crimination, the NLRB need not turn itself into a quasi-EEOC. The
NLRB could defer to the EEOC on more controversial or complex
issues.82 Or, in lieu of deferring to the EEOC, the Board could legiti-
mately proceed with great caution and thereby avoid the pitfalls which
have so ensnared the EEOC.8 3
7' Adams, supra note 6, at 127. The report concludes that fair employment legislation will
not alone eliminate unequal employment opportunities.
79 This is, after all, what the NLRB does day after day in cases arising under Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act wherein employees complain that they have been discriminated against because of
union activities. During 1973, 63 percent of the charges filed with the NLRB against
employers involved alleged discrimination. 38 NLRB ANN. REP. 93 (1974).
81 Peck, Remedies in Racial Discrimination in Employment: A Comparative Evaluation of
Forums, 46 WASH. L. REV. 455 (1971); Rosen, Division of Authority Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Preliminary Study in Federal-State Interagency Relations, 34
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 846 (1966). Compare 38 NLRB ANN. REP. 6 (1974) (the NLRB's
pending caseload) with Wall Street J., supra note 2 (EEOC backlog).
81 Cf. Boyce, supra note 21; cases cited in notes 8 and 9 supra.
82 Cf. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837(1971). The NLRB could properly defer to
the EEOC in novel, complex, or controversial issues on the basis that the EEOC, not the
NLRB, is primarily responsible for effectuating national labor policy in matters of racial
discrimination.
83 Id. Issues such as reverse discrimination, quotas, special treatment for minorities,
comparative seniority systems, and others, might be avoided. For examples and discussions
of some of these issues, see Jersey Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, -F.2d- (3d Cir. 1975);
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1039 (7th Cir. 1974); Local 189, Paper Makers v.
United States, 416 F.2d 980(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S: 919 (1970); United States v.
Sheet Metal Workers, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); Kaplan, supra note 74.
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By assuming some of the responsibility for policing racial discrimi-
nation, the NLRB would free the EEOC of a portion of its load. The
EEOC could then function more efficiently, zeroing in on the serious
areas of discriminatory conduct. One of the EEOC's greatest handi-
caps has been its inability to allocate resources on a "worst first
basis"., 4 With NLRB assistance, the EEOC would be able to divert its
primary attention from individual private complaints.8 "
B. Arguments Against an NLRB Role
Against the foregoing policy considerations militates a powerful,
and perhaps determinative, counterargument: the possibility that
opening the NLRB to allegations of employer racial discrimination
would so overwhelm the agency as to divert it from its main function.
The NLRB's traditional function has not been to police racial dis-
crimination though such may be related to concerted activity. Its
primary purpose is "fostering collective bargaining, protecting em-
ployee rights to act concertedly, and conducting elections . "..."86
Certainly, the NLRB should not risk jeopardizing major employee and
union rights under the Act.
Whether this would necessarily be the cost of the added jurisdiction
is subject to speculation. The NLRB is best able to evaluate its own
resources and potential and to predict its ability to take on employer
racial discrimination without impairing its other functions. Initially,
then, it should be the NLRB's task to confront the problem.
The NLRB, however, has failed thus far to deal with the issue'8"
Since neither Congress nor the public knows the NLRB's capabilities
in this area, the NLRB should frankly state whether it can or can not
assume this burden. If a negative determination is made, the issue will
then be passed on to Congress and the public for appropriate action.
If, on the other hand, the NLRB finds that it can feasibly manage juris-
diction over such matters, it should say so and perhaps reverse its
present position.88
84 Adams, supra note 6, at 130.
85 This is not to underestimate the importance of such private complaints. They, too, need
immediate attention which the EEOC has likewise not provided.
86 Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272, 273 (1973).
87 Member Kennedy has touched on this issue but has not supported his conclusion with
statistics or any rationale. See note 30 supra.
81 Another issue that the NLRB must consider is whether, if it assumes jurisdiction over
cases involving racial discrimination, it must also assumejurisdiction over sex discrimination
cases. While the latter problem is outside the scope of this article, many of the legal and
policy arguments detailed above apply to sex as well as race discrimination. On the other
hand, the NLRB has already recognized a distinction between the two types of discrimina-
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IV. CONCLUSION
Employer racial discrimination remains a cancerous disease in our
society which must be removed. The NLRB, charged with protecting
the "legitimate rights" of employees, has the legal weapons to enter
the fight against racial discrimination. The issue is ripe for reconsid-
eration.89
tion. In Bekins Moving and Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 7(1974), the only holding upon which
an NLRB majority could agree was that a union was disqualified from receiving certification
when it practiced discrimination on the basis of "race, alienage, or national origin." There
was no majority on the issue of other types of discrimination. Accordingly, the Acting
Regional Director for the NLRB's 13th Regional Office has held that Bekins does not
preclude certification for a union which allegedly practices sex disci'imination. Union Car-
bide Corp., 86 L.R.R.M. 1606 (1974). See also Bell & Howell, 213 N.L.R.B. 79 (1974).
89 Significantly, the United States Supreme Court, albeit implicitly and only by footnote,
very recently apparently cited with approval the District of Columbia Court of Appeals'
decision in United Packing House Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969): Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition Community Organiza-
tion, 43 U.S.L.W. 4214 (1975). This is still further reason for the NLRB to reevaluate its
position.
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